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ABSTRACT
Covert channels are any communication channel that can be exploited to transfer information in a
manner that violates the system’s security policy. Research in the field has shown that, like many
communication channels, IPv4 and the TCP/IP protocol suite have been susceptible to covert
channels, which could be exploited to leak data or be used for anonymous communications. With
the introduction of IPv6, researchers are acutely aware that many vulnerabilities of IPv4 have
been remediated in IPv6. However, a proof of concept covert channel system was demonstrated in
2006. A decade later, IPv6 and its related protocols have undergone major changes, which has
introduced a need to reevaluate the current state of covert channels within IPv6. The current
research demonstrates the corroboration of covert channels in IPv6 by building a tool that
establishes a covert channel against a simulated enterprise network. This is further validated
against multiple channel criteria.
INTRODUCTION
Covert channels and various other research on
the subject have been in existence for more
than four decades. As early as 1973, [22]
explained a method of exploiting the
communication channels that are “not intended
for information transfer at all, such as the
service program’s effect on the system load”
and termed it “Covert Channels” as opposed to
the “legitimate channels” of communication. In
1986, the Department of Defense not only gave
a formal definition for covert channels, but also
classified them into “storage channels” and
“timing channels” based on their methods of
operation [23]. While a covert storage channel
involves “the direct or indirect writing of a
storage location by one process and the direct
or indirect reading of it by another,” a covert
timing channel involves signaling mechanisms
that modifies the response time, which conveys
the data [25]. Many research studies showed
that the weaknesses in the TCP/IP design and
implementation could be exploited, which
paved a way for new covert channels, mainly
in IPv4. Although, the beginning of IPv4
address exhaustion in February of 2011 [27], is
demanding the organizations to migrate to
IPv6. This has led to various research studies
to proactively find covert channels in IPv6 so
as to provide better network security. The
current research attempts to create a tool to
prove the capabilities of establishing such
covert channels in IPv6 so that it could be
studied in detail.
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REVIEW OF
RELEVANT
LITERATURE
In 1997, [30] showed that IPv4 (mainly TCP
encapsulated in IPv4) has vulnerabilities,
which were exploited in order to create a
covert channel, which was called “covert TCP
program,” and allowed for the leaking vital
data through a network. The IP identification
field, TCP initial sequence number field, and
TCP acknowledgment number field were used
to accomplish the exploit. It was explained
how these posed a major security threat and
how these could be exploited “in the areas of
data smuggling and anonymous
communication.” Also noted in this work was
that the detection of such channels could be
difficult, mainly if they were encrypted or if
“the packets were bounced off an external
server” making them seem legitimate.
[2] furthered the research by [30] and
presented his thesis on covert channel analysis
and data hiding in IPv4. He not only provided
a compendium of prior research in the field,
but also explained various exploits that
allowed the creation of covert channels. He
explained that covert channel based on packet
header manipulation were not restricted to
only a TCP header, but also IGMP and ICMP
headers by the use of various encoding
mechanisms. He also discussed another method
of creation of covert channels, “data hiding
through packet sorting.” This method worked
based on various algorithms that could be used
to sort and resort packets. These packets could
then be encrypted using the IPSec
architecture, thereby providing confidentiality
through the network and avoiding detection of
the packet header modifications by powerful
Firewalls or IDS. Interestingly, he did not
discuss the negative implications of covert
channels such as data leakage, rather presented
it as a means of improving the network
security. Finally, he noted covert channels on
IPv6 as future work, as early as 2002.
Unfortunately, there is no published work on
this topic.
[24] reviewed various research studies on
covert channels at the time and showed the
existence of numerous other exploits than the
usual packet header manipulations discussed
by the previous researchers, that allowed the
creation of covert channels. They included,
“Covert Messaging through TCP Timestamps,”
“IP Checksum Covert Channels and Selected
Hash Collision,” “Malicious ICMP Tunneling,”
and “Exploitation of data streams authorized
by a network access control system for
arbitrary data transfers: tunneling and covert
channels over the HTTP protocol” They also
described various implementations of covert
channels such as, “Data Hiding in TCP/IP
with HTTP Reverse Proxy Servers,” and “IP
Covert Timing Channels.” Like, [2], [24]
provided a glimpse of IPv6 covert channel
research at that time. They also showed how
[15] exploited the IPv6 Destination option to
create a covert messaging tool. Even though
IPv6 deployments were uncommon even as late
as 2008 [10], the research on covert channels in
IPv6 existed as early as 2003.
One of the two important research studies
that are the basis for the current research is
[25], while the other one being a proof of
concept by [26]. To be precise, [25] did a
“specification-based analysis, to identify
redundancies and ambiguities in the protocol
semantics that could potentially be used to
carry covert data,” and provided a
comprehensive list of 22 potential covert
channels in IPv6. Although, none are known to
have been exploited as of this writing, some of
their findings included:
1. The number of research studies on
network storage covert channels was
more than the number of research
studies on network timing covert
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channels owing to the synchronization
issues and lower band- width of the
latter. In their opinion, this potentially
eliminates the need for further study on
network timing covert channels  
2. The most effective defense mechanisms
of the time against IPv4 covert
channels were protocol scrubbers,
traffic normalizers and active wardens.
They did not explain if these defense
mechanisms hold good against IPv6
covert channels, which paves a way for
a study on how these mechanism fare
against IPv6 covert channels  
3. There were at least six IPv6 covert
channels, created by exploiting six
fields in the IPv6 header such as,
Traffic Class, Flow Label, Pay- load
Length, Next Header (adding various
extension headers to it), Hop Limit and
Source Address  
4. Other potential IPv6 covert channels
could be created by exploiting the
extension headers such as the Hop-by-
Hop Options Header, Routing Header,
Fragment Header, Destination Options
Header, Authentication Header,
Encapsulation Security Payload Header
 
5. More covert channels could be created
by tunneling traffic such as IPv6 in
IPv4, IPv6 in IPv6 and IPv4 in IPv6.  
They finally noted covert channels in
ICMPv6 as their future work, but in the same
year, [26] showcased this to be possible.
In 2006, [26] demonstrated a proof of
concept tool called “V00d00n3t,” which
exploited the ICMPv6 echo-reply payload to
create a covert data channel. He showed that
he was able to transfer data over the Internet
in a network infrastructure which was designed
using a tunnel broker and a set of routers and
servers, as explained in the topology in [26].
Although the design validated that the packets
would survive in a ’slick’ 6 network and wild
uncontrolled environments, he noted that the
limitation was the survival of the covert data
in a production environment with firewalls,
IPS/IDS etc. This motivated the introduction
of Firewalls and IDS in the current study.
NEED FOR
REEVALUATION
Although [25] discussed the various covert
channels in IPv6 and [26] showed a proof of
concept of the IPv6 covert channels, major
changes have been introduced in IPv6 since
2006, making the research studies potentially
obsolete and introducing the need to
understand the current scenario. Both [25] and
[26] worked on the basis of the three IPv6-
related RFCs that existed in 2006, RFC 2460
[16], RFC 3697 [28], and RFC 4443 [11].
Since 2006, there have been no fewer than
12 RFC drafted to update IPv6 and ICMPv6
operations. Some of these RFC were drafted in
an attempt to close potential security issues,
while others were drafted to improve
operations of those protocols. While some of
these RFCs successfully closed the issues
specified within, others were not so successful.
In some cases, when one issue was resolved,
another was inadvertently created with respect
to the specifics of establishing and maintaining
covert channels. Some of those relevant RFCs
(along with additional readings on the impacts
and potentials for exploitation) are:
1. RFC 4294 “IPv6 Node Requirements”,
April 2006 [17]  
2. RFC 4727 “Experimental Values In
IPv4, IPv6, ICMPv4, ICMPv6, UDP,
and TCP Headers”, November 2006 [13]
 
3. RFC 4884 “Extended ICMP to Support
Multi-Part Messages”, April 2007 [7]  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4. RFC 5095 “Deprecation of Type 0
Routing Headers in IPv6”, December
2007 [1]. [19]  
5. RFC 5722 “Handling of Overlapping
IPv6 Fragments”, December 2009 [20]  
6. RFC5871“IANAAllocationGuidelinesfor
theIPv6RoutingHeader”, May 2010 [3]  
7. RFC 6437 “IPv6 Flow Label
Specification”, November 2011: This
RFC obsoleted RFC 3697 used by [26]
[29]  
8. RFC 6564 “A Uniform Format for IPv6
Extension Headers”, April 2012 [21]  
9. RFC 6935 “IPv6 and UDP Checksums
for Tunneled Packets”, April 2013 [9]  
10. RFC 6946 “Processing of IPv6 Atomic
Fragments”, May 2013 [14]  
11. RFC 7045 “Transmission and
Processing of IPv6 Extension Headers”,
December 2013 [18]  
12. RFC 7112 “Implications of Over-sized
IPv6 Header Chains”, January 2014 [8]
Taking into consideration the above
changes, the current research aims at
understanding and validating the
establishment of covert channels in a
representative enterprise IPv6
implementations. In addition, most of the
previous research studies were theoretical,
without a proper proof of concept to validate
the theory. To remediate this deficiency, the
goal of this research required building a tool
that could exploit the flaws in design and
implementation of IPv6 and related protocols
to create a covert channel, thereby providing
proof of concept.
NETWORK DESIGN
The main part of the proof of concept was
building a software tool that could covertly
transfer data through an IPv6 network akin to
the real-world networks. In order to simulate
this, the network topology described in the
figure 1 was used. This topology was designed
similar to the one tested by [26] in his POC, as
an uncontrolled network environment and
proved to be working. The local site was
designed with an Ubuntu PC (Linux kernel
3.19.0-26) which acted as a client that leaked
information, a Cisco router (IOS 15.5(1)T) and
a PFSense firewall (v2.2.4) with Snort (2.9.7.5
pkg v3.2.7) and Suricata (2.0.8 RELEASE pkg
v2.1.6) packages installed, simulating a small
business enterprise network. The PFSense
firewall was connected on its WAN side to the
IPv4 Internet. The PFSense firewall created a
IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel to a tunnel broker
maintained by Hurricane Electric [12]. The
remote site consisted of a Ubuntu server
(Linux kernel 3.19.0-26) that received the
leaked data, and was behind a Cisco router
(IOS 15.5(1)T). The Cisco router was
connected on its WAN side to the IPv4
Internet and created an IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel
to Hurricane Electric.
The PFSense firewall was configured as a
potential small-to-medium enterprise network,
with the some basic features such as NAT,
access control and deep packet inspection of
known protocols. The Snort IDS was
configured with the subscription ruleset, which
is “the same Snort ruleset developed for the
NGIPS” and used by businesses, according to
[31]. The Snort IDS was configured to use all
categories of signatures published in the
ruleset. This proprietary enterprise solution
was complemented with Suricata, “a high
performance open-source Network IDS, IPS
and Network Security Monitoring engine” [33].
All the features of Suricata as described in [32]
were enabled.
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SOFTWARE DESIGN
The software tool called “Covertv6” was
developed in Python using Scapy library, “a
powerful interactive packet manipulation
program that enables the user to send, sniff,
dissect and forge network packets” [6].
Covertv6 was designed to exploit the following
covert channels:
1. 1. IPv6 Flow Label [29, 16] 
2. 2. IPv6 Extension Headers [5, 18, 4, 16]
3. 3. ICMPv6 [11, 34, 16]
Covertv6 was designed to run both as a
client and a server in one of the following
communication modes:
1. Beacon: where the server usually sends
a beacon packet and the client leaks
the data as a response to the beacon
packet, thereby hiding the data in a
legitimate communication channel.  
2. Transfer: where the server is in
listening mode all the time and the
client leaks the data based on the
configuration.  
Covertv6 requires as input a file or a
directory to be transferred and has the ability
to specify the size of the payload (for a
payload based exploit, otherwise uses constant
values) and the rate at which the data should
be leaked. The tool could also randomize the
data leakage rate. The client initially sends a
beacon packet to test the liveliness of the
server and the reachability through the
network. The beacon is usually an ICMPv6
echo request, but could also be a UDP packet
with a zero checksum. The server sends a
response and this signals the client to start the
transfer. The client archives the file/folder in
‘.zip’ format, to preserve the integrity of the
files contained, throughout the binary data
transfer process. The client then reads the
bitstream of the zipped data and packs into a
buffer set, each of the size as mentioned
earlier. This buffered data is then encoded
differently based on various exploits as follows.
Figure 1 - Network Architecture for Testing
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The client sends a ‘start of leak’ beacon
denoting the start of the data leak.
5.1 IPv6 Flow Label
The client encodes the 20-bit flow label
value in an ICMPv6 echo request packet with
the buffered data and sends it to the server at
the rate con- figured (or at random intervals).
5.2 IPv6 Extension Headers
The client encodes the buffered data into
one of the following extension headers as
described below and sends it to the server at
the rate configured (or at random intervals):
The client encodes the buffered data into
one of the following extension headers as
described below and sends it to the server at
the rate configured (or at random intervals):
1. Hop-by-Hop Options Header - Using
PadN to create jumbograms - This is a
type of payload based covert channel  
2. Destination Options Header - Encoding
the data into the options field of the
IPv6 header  
3. Routing Header - Using experimental
Routing Type to send type-specific
data  
4. Authentication Header - Encoding the
data into the payload field of this
header - This is a type of payload
based covert channel  
5. Encapsulating Security Payload Header
- Encoding the data into the payload
field of this header - This is a type of
payload based covert channel  
6. Custom Extension Header - Using the
experimental header type values and
encoding the data into the
payload/value field of the header - This
is a type of payload based covert
channel  
5.3 ICMPv6
While the previous two exploits worked on
both modes of communication of the tool such
as transfer and beacon modes, exploiting
ICMPv6 required a different approach. Most of
the ICMPv6 based covert channels worked
based on the beacon mode where the covert
packets would be created as a response to a
packet they received. This required configuring
the Firewall to allow ICMPv6 beacons from
the server, which is often not the case in an
enterprise network. The firewalls allowed
packets through a pre-established connection.
The tool exploited this by sending an ICMPv6
Echo Request packet first from the client, to
which the server responds with an ICMPv6
Echo Reply, which acts as a beacon, thereby
allowing the client to respond with one of the
following ICMPv6 covert packets:
1. Destination Unreachable - The client
sends the buffered data as pay- load in
the ‘destination unreachable’ message
with ICMPv6 type 1 code 0 - This is a
type of payload based covert channel  
2. Packet Too Big - The client sends the
buffered data as payload in the
ICMPv6 type 2 code 0 message - This
is a type of payload based covert
channel  
3. Time Exceeded - The client sends the
buffered data as payload in the
ICMPv6 type 3 code 0 message - This
is a type of payload based covert
channel  
4. Parameter Problem - The client sends
the buffered data as payload in the
ICMPv6 type 4 code 0 message, with
the pointer set to ‘0xFF’ - This is a
type of payload based covert channel  
 
5. Echo Request - The exploit using
ICMPv6 Echo Request preferred the
transfer mode and used the payload
field to covertly send the data  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6. Echo Reply - The exploit using
ICMPv6 Echo Reply required a beacon
with ICMPv6 being allowed through
the Firewall, then sending the covert
data in the payload  
The server receives the packets and
decodes the exploited field and adds it to its
buffer for data reconstruction. As soon as all
the data is transferred, the client sends a ‘end
of leak’ beacon, and the server starts the
reconstruction process. The server reconstructs
the ‘.zip’ file from the bitstream and extracts
the archive to get the transferred data.
TESTING
METHODOLOGY
The first step in the methodology was to
determine if a covert channel could be
established using each of the three IPv6 or
ICMPv6 options described above. Once the
establishment of each of those had been
confirmed, each of the three main covert
channels were tested further and their
feasibility was observed under three conditions:
1. 1. Varying the size of the leaked data
in the covert packets
2. 2. Varying the time interval of transfer
between packets 
3. 3. Varying the time randomness of
transfer of the packets
For the purpose of the proof of concept, an
ISO file of size 1MB and a directory of size
1MB containing text documents, were
transferred through the covert channel. Figure
2 shows the working of Covertv6, while figure
3 shows a capture of one of the covert channel,
with the ‘start of leak’ beacon packet.
Figure 2. Covert6 Tool Options
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Figure 3. Start of Leak Frame
RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
The preliminary findings from the proof of
concept are shown in Table 1. This shows the
different attributes that were used as exploits
in order to create the covert channels in IPv6,
the communication modes of the tool that the
exploits used, the possibility of a successful
data transfer over the setup in the above three
conditions.
Table 1
Test Results of Covert6
Exploits for Covert Channels
Mode VariablePayload Size
Variable
Transfer
Rate
1 IPv6 Flow Label Both ✓ ✓
2 IPv6 Extension Headers
Hop-by-Hop Options Both ✓ ✓
Destination Options Both ✓ ✓
Routing Both ✓ ✓
Authentication Both ✓ ✓
Encapsulate Security Payload Both ✓ ✓
Custom Extension Both ✓ ✓
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Exploits for Covert Channels
Mode VariablePayload Size
Variable
Transfer
Rate
3 ICMPv6
Destination Unreachable Both1 ✓ ✓
Packet Too Big Both1 ✓ ✓
Time Exceeded Both1 ✓ ✓
Parameter Problem Both1 ✓ ✓
Echo Request Transfer ✓ ✓
Echo Reply Both1 ✓ ✓
1Beacon Mode Preferred
7.1 IPv6 Flow Label
In RFC 6437, [29] established the ability to
exploit the 20-bit flow label in IPv6 header to
create covert channels and how it would not be
detected by conventional means. The results of
this study corroborate the exploit of the flow
label field to create covert channels.
7.2 IPv6 Extension Headers
[13], [20], [3], [21], and [18] made changes
to the IPv6 Extension Headers defined by RFC
2460 and noted that a forwarding device in the
path of a packet containing extension headers
must conform to the standards and not drop
the packets if they do not understand those
headers (for example, experimental headers).
Taking that into consideration, the tool
exploited various fields in the Extension
Headers. The findings suggest that the creation
of covert channels by exploiting these
Extension Headers is still possible.
7.3 ICMPv6
The findings suggest that the potential
creation of covert channels by exploiting
various field and messages of ICMPv6. The
following observations can also be made:
1. Although RFC 4443 [11] mandates that
“for security reasons, it is recommended
that implementations SHOULD allow
sending of ICMP destination
unreachable messages to be disabled,
preferably on a per-interface basis,” it is
observed that implementations still
allow ‘destination unreachable’
messages. Also, it could be observed
that most implementations do not
check the payload field of the message
which should ideally be part of the
invoking packet  
2. RFC 4443 [11] states that “unlike other
messages, a ‘packet too big’ message is
sent in response to a packet received
with an IPv6 multicast destination
address, or with a link-layer multicast
or link- layer broadcast address,”
thereby making this exploit unfeasible.
But RFC 6946 [14] explains that a huge
packet could still invoke the ‘packet too
big’ message if it has to be fragmented
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by an intermediate node. This helps in
exploiting the payload of the message  
3. Since RFC 4443 [11] states that “the
pointer in the ‘parameter problem’
message will point beyond the end of
the ICMPv6 packet if the field in error
is beyond what can fit in the maximum
size of an ICMPv6 error message,” it
could be observed that most
implementations allow any data in the
payload of the ‘parameter problem’
message  
4. The RFC 4443 did not mandate
implementations to allow/block the
‘time exceeded’, ‘echo request’, and
‘echo reply’ and it depended on the
network configuration of the path.  
5. All the ICMPv6 based covert channels
worked in transfer mode through a
poorly configured Firewall/IDS.  
CONCLUSION
The current research strived to demonstrate a
proof of concept by designing a tool to create
covert channels in IPv6, thereby providing
corroboration of its existence, in a simulated
enterprise infrastructure consisting of
enterprise Routers, Firewalls, IDS, and
Internet. The preliminary findings from the
research suggest the possible creation of covert
channels by exploiting the IPv6 ‘flow label’
field, IPv6 extension headers such as, the ‘hop-
by-hop options’ header, ‘destination options’
header, ‘routing’ header, ‘authentication’
header, ‘encapsulating security payload’ header
and custom extension header, and various
message types of ICMPv6 such as, the
‘destination unreachable,’ ‘packet too big,’
‘time exceeded,’ ‘parameter problem,’ ‘echo
request,’ and ‘echo reply.’ The current study
did not exploit all possible covert channels in
IPv6 and did not attempt to encrypt the
covert channel, since they are out of scope of
the current research. Future work will include
a study on the behavior and response of the
enterprise Firewall and IDS solution to covert
channels in IPv6, an attempt at corroborating
other possible covert channels in IPv6 and a
research on encrypted covert channels.
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